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1 Introduction
The last sixty years of growth have been far from steady. For every “growth miracle” we
can easily find a counterpart in the form of a “miraculous collapse”. For example, the East
Asian miracle was interrupted by the Asian financial crisis, China’s take-off in 1978 was
preceded by decades of disastrous economic policies, Latin America was frequently rocked
by political turmoil and economic volatility, and several African nations went from “up
and coming” in the 1950s to requiring outside assistance within a few years. Moreover,
during the post-war period, there is a long list of relatively short-lived developed country
crises including the first global recession in 1957, the global oil crisis in 1973–74, the debt
crisis of 1982, and the Nordic banking crisis of the 1990s. What can we learn from such
abrupt changes in growth? Do some countries deal better with negative growth shocks
than others? Is the ability to respond effectively to shocks a key factor in explaining the
long-run divergence in economic performance?
The instability of growth is not a new concern in economics. A growing literature on
trend breaks has established that most growth performances are not steady but instead
marked by switching between very different growth regimes. In this view, growth is
no longer defined by a single average trend but consists of many qualitatively different
episodes, such as crises, recoveries, stagnation, slows downs, and accelerations. This
non-linear perspective provides better insights into the underlying dynamics and has
established new stylized facts. For example, in developed and developing countries alike,
growth is relatively easy to ignite (Hausmann et al., 2005) but much harder to sustain
(Berg et al., 2012). However, the negative implications of unsteady growth paths are
just beginning to be explored. Long-lasting slumps can nullify decades of positive growth
and there is no guarantee that lost potential output after a slump is ever fully recouped
(Cerra and Saxena, 2008; Reddy and Minoiu, 2009). It thus becomes important to ask,
why do some declines last so much longer than others?
A potential answer is that the duration of declines during slumps is driven by the
prevailing structure and quality of institutions. Institutions create particular political and
economic incentives, solve or worsen coordination failures and define the set of feasible
policies. Seminal contributions to the institutions and growth literature link stronger
institutions to higher levels of GDP per capita (Acemoglu et al., 2001, 2002) and others
have shown that strong institutions, democracy and political stability bring about reduced
output volatility (Acemoglu et al., 2003; Mobarak, 2005; Klomp and de Haan, 2009).
However, there is still a lack of evidence convincingly linking institutions to short and
medium-run growth dynamics.
Each type of growth episode has distinct characteristics. We can analyze the switching
among growth regimes, the rate of growth within a regime, the duration of a regime,
or even the typical sequence of regime switches that makes up a growth path. Out
of this plethora of possibilities, this paper focuses on three points. First, how can we
identify large economic slumps empirically? Second, what happens when slumps occur?
Specifically, is there any evidence of institutional change? Third, conditionally on the
occurrence of a slump, do weak institutions prolong the duration of the decline phase?
We focus on this conditional question, as economic crises can be triggered by a
variety of external or internal factors which are not (always) linked to weak institutions.
However, how a country deals with a negative shock, that is, if the decline phase takes
longer than necessary, depends on the political system’s ability to react with coordinated
policies and avert outright social conflict. This notion derives from a large body of
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political economy theory putting social tension and the ability of resilient institutions to
manage such conflict at the center of development theory (e.g. Acemoglu and Robinson,
2006; North et al., 2009; Besley and Persson, 2011). Some of these theories argue that
weakly institutionalized societies, or ‘limited access orders’, are prone to collapses and
that, during a crises, the declining rents further strain the institutional set-up and the
prevailing political arrangements (e.g. North et al., 2009). Weak institutions thus bring
with them an increased vulnerability to crises and potentially much longer declines once
slumps occur. Similar mechanisms are suggested in the literature on institutions and
macroeconomic volatility. Acemoglu et al. (2003), for example, argue that institutions
determine “whether there will be significant swings in the political and social environment
leading to crises, and whether politicians will be induced to pursue unsustainable policies
in order to remain in power in the face of deep social cleavages.” (p. 54). So even if
better policy responses are available, a combination of coordination failures, rent seeking
and power struggles combined with dormant social conflict may lead to longer declines
in weakly institutionalized environments. Hence, the interplay of institutions and social
conflict plays out at a “deeper” level than more proximate responses to crises.
The findings of this paper broadly support this theoretical perspective. First, we
find evidence of weaker institutions preceding the start of a slump and clear signs of
institutional reforms in following years. Second, longer decline phases are robustly linked
to weak institutions and particularly strongly to a measure of ethnic cleavages (ethno-
linguistic fractionalization). Ethnic cleavages are especially important for understanding
declines in Sub-Saharan Africa (see also Easterly and Levine, 1997). Third, we
show that weak institutions and high fractionalization interact negatively. In weakly
institutionalized and highly fragmented societies declines last considerably longer.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 motivates and outlines
the restricted structural change approach used to identify slumps and defines the duration
of the decline phase. Section 3 provides descriptive statistics of the estimated slumps and
very briefly discusses the data used in the subsequent analysis. Section 4 investigates the
characteristics of slumps and the evolution of covariates before, during and after a slump
occurs. Section 5 analyzes the duration of the decline phase and provides a substantive
interpretation of the main results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Identifying slumps
Restricted structural breaks
Beginning with Pritchett’s (2000) classification of post-World War II growth experiences
into “Hills, Plateaus, Mountains, and Plains”, a large and growing empirical literature
sets out to investigate the characteristics of different types of growth episodes. Many of
these papers employ either simple or more complex tests of structural stability to define
and identify their episode of interest. For example, Hausmann et al. (2005) use economic
criteria to isolate growth accelerations and then date their beginning with a very simple
breakpoint test. Other authors, such as Jones and Olken (2008) and Berg et al. (2012),
use versions of the Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) test for multiple unknown change points
to classify different growth episodes. A third set of papers solely relies on economic
criteria to identify and date the episode of interest (e.g. Calvo et al., 2006; Hausmann
et al., 2008; Reddy and Minoiu, 2009).
Not every change in growth rates amounts to a regime switch. The main advantage
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of econometric tests for multiple structural breaks over any set of predefined economic
criteria is that they allow for an inferential approach to identifying growth regimes.
However, since the particular type of structural change is left unspecified, these tests
may not identify the theoretically desired type of regime switch but rather any form
of significant change which must then be classified ex post. Furthermore, while break
estimators work well for identifying growth spurts, they perform poorly when it comes
to identifying recessions or growth collapses.1 Methods based solely on deterministic
economic criteria, on the other hand, cannot discriminate among multiple plausible
starting points or assess whether an episode truly constitutes a departure from the
previous growth regime.
To improve the identification of what we interchangeably refer to as deep recessions,
slumps, or growth collapses, Papell and Prodan (2012) propose a two-break model with
parameter restrictions. They demonstrate that this modified structural change approach
consistently identifies well-known slumps, such as the Great Depression in the United
States. The key innovation is to impose features of the desired pattern directly instead of
searching for unrestricted structural changes. Their two-break model accounts for three
growth regimes (a pre-slump regime, a contraction/ recovery regime, and a post-slump
regime) and places sign restrictions onto the estimated coefficients to ensure the breaks
occur in the desired direction. Since this approach is a version of Bai’s (1999) sequential
likelihood ratio test, the number of slumps – which is not known in advance – can then be
estimated by recursively applying the model on ever smaller sub-samples until all breaks
in the GDP per capita series have been found.
The restricted structural change approach can easily be modified to allow for other
plausible structures, such as three-break models (e.g., to estimate a pre-slump regime, a
decline, a recovery and a post-slump regime). However, estimating three or more breaks
for each slump quickly becomes computationally expensive and does not necessarily
provide better results than a simpler two-break model.2 While Papell and Prodan (2012)
focus on the question whether growth in a few developed countries eventually returns to
its pre-slump trend path, we apply a variant of this method to identify slumps in a large
sample of countries over the period from 1950 to 2008.
We define slumps according to three intuitive criteria. First, a slump is a departure
from a previously positive trend. Second, a slump must begin with negative growth in
the first year. Third, all slumps should be pronounced regime switches and not just
minor business cycle fluctuations. The precise meaning of ‘pronounced’ depends on each
country’s idiosyncratic growth process. We do not impose a minimum depth.
We capture these criteria in the following partial structural change model:
yt = α+βt+γ01(t > tb1)+γ1(t−tb1)1(t > tb1)+γ2(t−tb2)1(t > tb2)+
p∑
i=1
δiyt−i+t (1)
where yt is the log of GDP per capita, β is a time trend, γ0 is the coefficient on an intercept
break occurring together with a trend change (γ1) after the first break at time tb1, γ2
1As Papell and Prodan (2012) point out, this applies to the entire class of “generic” tests for single
and multiple breaks (Andrews, 1993; Bai and Perron, 1998, 2003; Perron and Qu, 2006).
2Let q = T − 2τT − h, where τ is the trimming fraction and h is the distance between breaks, then
the two-break model estimates (q2 + q)/2 regressions for the first iteration, while a three-break model
already requires
∑q
i=1(i
2 + i)/2 = (1/12)q(q + 1)(2q + 4) − 1, with q = T − 2τT − 2h to now allow for
three breaks. Additional results are available on request.
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is the coefficient for a second trend change occurring after the second break at time tb2,
1(·) is an indicator function selecting the regime, p is the optimal lag order determined
by the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) to parametrically adjust for the presence of
serial correlation, and t is a martingale difference sequence such that E[t|Ft−1] = 0 with
Ft−1 = {yt−1, yt−2, . . . } representing the entire history of the series.
The model in equation (1) formalizes the notion that the evolution of GDP per capita
around a slump is a simple function of time split into three different growth regimes: (1)
a pre-slump regime from the beginning of the time series of a country until time tb1, (2) a
slump/recovery regime lasting from time tb1 + 1 to time tb2, and (3) a post-slump regime
from time tb2 + 1 onwards. The true location of the breakpoints is not assumed known
but estimated within the model. We impose two restrictions to make sure we only select
breaks meeting our definition of slumps. First, we require β > 0, so that growth must be
positive in the years before a slump begins. Second, we also impose the condition that
γ0 < 0, so that a slumps always starts with a drop in the intercept.
3 Slope shifts are
left unrestricted, so that the model can catch unfinished slumps (e.g., declines from tb1
onwards, possibly lasting until the end of a country’s time series).
We implement the sequential break search algorithm as follows. First, we fit the
structural change model specified in equation (1) for all possible combinations of tb1
and tb2. We always exclude 5% of the observations at the beginning and end of the
sample to avoid registering spurious breaks. Second, we compute the sup-W test statistic,
that is, the supremum of a Wald test of the null hypothesis of no structural change
(H0 : γ0 = γ1 = γ2 = 0) over all possible combinations of break dates satisfying the two
restrictions. Third, we bootstrap the empirical distribution of the sup-W statistic (see
below). If the bootstrap test rejects at the 10% significance level, we record the break
pair (t̂b1, t̂b2) and split the sample into a series running until the first break and a series
starting just after the second break. The process starts again on each sub-sample until
the bootstrap test fails to reject the null hypothesis of no breaks or the sample gets too
small.4 This procedure converges to the true number of breaks (Bai, 1997).
A key issue in evaluating the statistical significance of endogenous breakpoints is that
the individual Wald tests over which the sup-W statistic is computed are not independent.
Assuming that there are in fact breaks present in the series, the closer the estimated break
dates get to the true breakpoints, the higher the test statistic will be, and vice versa.
For several single and multiple change-point problems, the limiting distribution of the
sup-W statistic or similar test statistics taking this dependency into account has been
derived (Andrews, 1993; Andrews and Ploberger, 1994; Bai, 1997, 1999; Bai and Perron,
1998; Hansen, 2000). However, asymptotic tests tend to underreject in finite samples
(Prodan, 2008) and an asymptotic distribution for our particular version of restricted
structural change is not available. To circumvent both issues, we construct a bootstrap
Monte Carlo test as follows. We first estimate the optimal AR(p) model under the null
hypothesis of no structural change. Then, we draw new errors (eˆ∗t ) from a standard
normal distribution with variance equal to that of the residuals estimated by the optimal
model under the null (denoted σ2eˆ), so that eˆ
∗
t ∼ N (0, σ2eˆ). Next, we recursively construct
a bootstrap series (y∗t ) based on the parameters estimated under the null together with
the new error series (eˆ∗t ). Using this bootstrap series, we then re-run the break search
algorithm and compute the sup-W statistic in exactly the same manner as before. We
3The intercept shift implies that we assume that there is an instantaneous drop. However, by not
restricting the coinciding trend break we also allow for longer lasting declines.
4We stop when T ≤ 20 to avoid registering spurious breaks.
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repeat this process 1000 times. Adopting the 10% significance level, the critical value
for each estimated sup-W statistic is then located at the 90th percentile of all recorded
bootstrapped sup-W statistics. Appendix A gives a more formal description of the break
search algorithm and the bootstrap.
The structural break methods applied in this paper assume that GDP per capita
is a regime-wise trend stationary process. This is not a trivial requirement. Ever
since the issue was first raised by Nelson and Plosser (1982), a vibrant literature has
been debating the question whether most GDP series are unit-root processes or can
be considered trend stationary. Originally, the conflicting views evolved around a clear
divide. If an output series is non-stationary, i.e., it has a unit root, then any shock to
the economy is permanent. If the series is trend stationary, then shocks are temporary;
after a while GDP is back on track as if the shock never occurred.5 Given the available
data, this issue cannot be fully resolved. It is generally difficult – if not impossible – to
convincingly differentiate between non-stationary and stationary time series when T is
only moderately large.
More recently, however, the debate has shifted. A process that is subject to structural
breaks presents an intermediate case. Broken-trend stationarity only implies that
within each regime growth can be approximated by a deterministic trend, but from one
regime to the next the trend path may change due to (semi-)permanent shocks such
as big recessions, growth accelerations or growth slow-downs. This allows for a flexible
description of the growth process as several different types of trend breaks can occur. In
fact, there is mounting evidence that once trend breaks are incorporated, many of the
GDP series previously thought to have unit roots may in fact be broken-trend stationary
(e.g. Zivot and Andrews, 1992; Ben-David and Papell, 1995). Broken trends blur the
conceptual distinction. A unit root process can be thought of as process with a trend
that changes every year.6
We do not attempt in this paper to characterize all types of breaks an economy can
experience, or to formally test for unit roots. Our approach is very flexible and allows for
multiple growth regimes occurring before, during and after an unknown number of slumps.
We assume that there is some structure in the growth process, but do not assume that
this structure is necessarily generated by neoclassical steady-state growth, endogenous
growth or other standard growth models. In fact, Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) recently
highlighted that growth in emerging markets can be characterized by shocks to trend
growth rather than transitory fluctuations around a stable trend as usually assumed in
real business cycle models. Hence, under certain conditions, broken trends are compatible
with several standard models of aggregate output.
The duration of declines
Within a slump, we separate the decline from the recovery phase, as these two processes
are driven by very different dynamics. We still need an estimate of the location of the
5A unit root process, such as a random walk with drift, can be written as yt = yt−1 +µ+ t, whereas
a trending process is yt = βt + t. A random shock t is incorporated permanently in the unit root
process but not in the trending process. However, this is embedded in the larger question of the degree
of fractional integration in GDP series (see Silverberg and Verspagen, 2003, for a discussion).
6Every year, or at any other observation frequency. For the same reason, it is easy to weaken the
evidence in favor of a unit root process and strengthen the evidence in favor of a broken-trend stationary
process as long as enough breakpoints are permitted.
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trough in order to actually identify the decline phase. Our method of dating the trough
is simple and only depends on whether the slump is finished or still continuing.
We define the end of a slump to have occurred with certainty in the first year a where
ya ≥ yt̂b1 . In other words, a slump is over as soon as the level of GDP per capita preceding
the slump has been recovered; until then, the slump is continuing.7 It is important to
note that the end of the slump does not coincide with the second break and is used only
as a device to find the trough. Given this endpoint, the trough is simply the year with the
lowest level of GDP per capita during the slump. The duration of the slump is censored
if GDP per capita does not reach the pre-slump level again by the end of the sample. In
such a case, even if GDP per capita seems to be recovering, we do not know how long the
slump may last. We define the censoring indicator c = 1(maxj∈(t̂b1,T ] yj < yt̂b1). Given
the set of possible end years A = {a | a ∈ (t̂b1, T ] and ya ≥ yt̂b1}, we estimate the trough
to occur at time:
tmin =
{
argminj∈(t̂b1,a0] yj, ∃j ∈ A ∧ c = 0
argminj∈(t̂b1,T ] yj, 6 ∃j ∈ A ∧ c = 1
(2)
where a0 = minA corresponds to the (certain) end of the slump. If the set A is empty,
then the slump is unfinished, and the length of the episode is censored. A provisional
trough occurs when yt attains a minimum after t̂b1. The duration of the decline phase
lasting from the beginning of the slump to the observed trough is simply t˜D = tˆmin− t̂b1.
These definitions also imply that in some cases we date the trough after the estimated
second break, which is purely a consequence of allowing for unfinished episodes. If the
slump is still ongoing, the second break may have been placed at an arbitrary point
maximizing the Wald statistic but not corresponding to the start of a new growth regime.8
The true trough may lie in the future, that is, beyond the end of the sample. Treating such
spells as censored implies that in the later analysis we only incorporate the information
that (certain) exit from the slump has not yet occurred after a duration t˜D.
Figure 1 illustrates some of the diversity of slumps identified by this method. Panel
(a) shows a finished slump in Mexico where the trend growth rate is nearly unchanged
after the slump. The slump begins in 1982 and encompasses more than a decade of
political volatility, hyperinflation, high debt and low growth. The trough is found in
1988. Another short downturn occurs during the Tequila crisis in 1994 after which the
Mexican economy returns to its pre-1982 growth path. Panel (b) shows a finished slump
in Switzerland where the trend growth rate decelerated after the slump. In 1975, the
Swiss economy was strongly affected by the Oil crisis of the mid-1970s, leading to a
7.87% drop in GDP per capita within one year. After the slump, Switzerland enters
a low growth regime typical for the high income economies in Western Europe of the
1980s and 1990s. Panel (c) shows a finished slump in Albania occurring at the time of
the post-communist transition with an accelerated post-slump trend. The estimated first
break occurs in 1990, the trough is located in 1991, and the second break occurs in 2002.
While the duration of the decline phase is only one year, output contracted considerably.
GDP per capita in 1991 was 15.32% lower than in 1990. Last but not least, panel (d)
shows an unfinished slump with a continuing decline in Togo. Togo grew rapidly for over
7Naturally, this also implies that we exclude episodes estimated by the sequential algorithm if these
begin before the previous slump is certain to have ended.
8A solution avoiding this problem would be to test if a restricted one break model works better than
a restricted two-break model for those cases.
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Figure 1 – Four types of slumps
(a) finished & unchanged trend
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the trend breaks. The bold vertical lines are at t̂b1 and t̂b2, respectively. The dashed vertical line indicates t̂min.
a decade following independence from France in 1960 but then experienced a dramatic
collapse under the 38-year reign of Gnassingbe´ Eyade´ma. The first break occurs in 1979,
but the second break is placed at an (economically) arbitrary point to accommodate the
lasting decline. Togo’s GDP per capita did not recover to its pre-slump level for the next
29 years. At the end of the observed period, the decline is ongoing and the provisional
trough coincides with the censoring cutoff in 2008. It’s the longest decline in the sample
and also one of the steepest (-53.6%).
3 Descriptive statistics and data
We apply the sequential algorithm to the entire Penn World Table (v7.0) yielding a total
of 58 slumps between 1950 and 2008.9 The mean duration from the first break to the
9We only run the algorithm on countries with a population of at least one million to exclude small
countries and island economies. In addition, we discard episodes that are solely driven by positive breaks
in the two slope coefficient(s) but are not caught by our second criterion (negative growth) due to the
presence of the AR(p) terms. A simple rule is applied to these cases. We define a valid episode as an
interval of two break dates t̂b1, t̂b2 ∈ [τT, (1 − τ)T ] satisfying: ∃j ∈ (t̂b1, t̂b2] such that min yj < yt̂b1 ,
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trough is about 7.7 years and the median duration is 3 years. Ten out of the 58 slumps
are censored and thus unfinished. For these spells the location of the trough is not yet
definitive. Table 8 in Appendix B lists all episodes and provides summary statistics.
We observe several well-known growth collapses and deep recessions. For example,
in the case of the Finnish banking crisis of the 1990s, we estimate that the last year
of the previous growth regime is 1989, the first year of the slump is 1990 and the
trough occurs in 1993.10 Chile’s tumultuous economic history shows up in several big
slumps. Pinochet’s coup, the subsequent reform programs, and chronic runaway inflation
manifested themselves once in a sudden recession in 1975 and again in a deep but short
slump in 1982-1983. We also identify several post-communist transitions, but for most
former communist countries there is no or too few pre-1990 GDP data available. Some
results are more surprising. For example, Poland’s economic downturn already occurs
during the 1980s and is not fully recovered by the time the transition takes place.
Figure 2 – Distribution of Downbreaks (calendar time)
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Which periods or decades experienced the most turbulence? Figure 2 examines the
annual distribution of the the first break date (t̂b1) over the entire sample range (called
‘downbreaks’). Most slumps begin between the 1970s and the early 1990s. We can clearly
observe three periods of elevated risk coinciding with well-known global events. Seven
downbreaks occur following the oil shock in 1973–1974, eleven declines begin between
1979 and 1981 during the debt crisis of the early 1980s, and nine slumps follow the post-
communist transitions of 1989–1990. Due to trimming and a deliberate sample cut-off
in 2008 to avoid the Great Recession of the late 2000s, we find no beginnings of slumps
in the period of the early 2000s and tranquil mid-2000s. Similarly, there are only few
slumps in the 1960s but several more in the 1950s, with three slumps beginning around
the time of the first post-WWII global recession of 1957. Generally, the period between
where τ is the trimming fraction and T is the length of the estimation sample. This rule only requires
that a contraction occurs within the range of the two estimated breaks, otherwise it is not a slump.
10This agrees well with other estimates (Jonung and Hagberg, 2005). The Finnish crisis is typically
dated to occur between 1991-1993, but GDP actually started to decline in 1990 already.
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the 1970s and early 1980s is marked by heightened volatility during which several star
performers of the previous years become mired in deep recession – an instability of growth
performances across decades that is well-documented in a number of studies (Easterly
et al., 1993; Rodrik, 1999; Pritchett, 2000; Jones and Olken, 2008).
Table 1 provides two additional perspectives on the data by summarizing the
distributions of depth, duration, and number of spells across income groups and
geographical regions. For this purpose, we define the depth of a decline as the percent
decrease of GDP per capita at the trough relative to its pre-slump level. We detect
considerably deeper slumps in low-income and middle-income countries than in high-
income (OECD) countries. The spread of depth and duration is very large. High-
income (OECD) countries experience relatively short declines with a comparatively soft
landing. The median duration is only one year with a mean depth of about -7.1%. In
the middle, there is little substantial variation between non-OECD high-income countries
and upper/lower-middle-income countries. In all of these three groups, the mean depth is
in the range of -20.8% to -27.4% and the median (mean) duration varies between about
5.4 to 6 (2 to 3) years. Low-income countries experience the most dramatic declines.
Both mean and median duration are about 16 years, with an associated average depth
of -34.2%. Interestingly, the number of spells itself is distributed relatively evenly across
the different income groups, suggesting that developed countries, too, experience their
fair share of (milder) volatility.
Table 1 – Depth and Duration by Income Level and Geographical Region
Mean Mean Median Number Censored Number of
Depth Duration Duration of Spells Spells Countries
Income Level
High Income (OECD) -7.12 2.00 1 12 0 29
High Income (Other) -20.84 5.38 2 8 1 12
Upper Middle Income -21.20 5.39 2 16 2 30
Lower Middle Income -27.40 6.00 3 11 3 34
Low Income -34.17 15.75 16 11 4 33
Geographical Region
East Asia & Pacific -13.63 2.30 2 10 0 17
Eastern Europe & Central Asia -19.70 3.40 2 5 0 10
Europe (excl. Eastern Europe) -8.37 1.50 1 6 0 22
Latin America & Caribbean -17.34 5.27 3 15 1 23
Middle East & North Africa -33.24 8.66 9 7 3 17
North America -2.51 - - 1 0 2
South Asia -5.33 - - 1 0 6
Sub-Saharan Africa -37.14 17.74 16 13 6 41
Total -21.87 7.69 3 58 10 138
Note(s): Depth is defined as the percent decrease in GDP per capita at the trough relative to GDP per capita before
the slump (percent, not log difference). Mean duration is the restricted mean in years; that is, the last observed value
is used to estimate the duration. Mean depth also uses the last observed value. As a result, both mean duration and
depth are underestimated. The number of countries refers to countries with more than one million inhabitants and
more than 20 observations of GDP per capita.
The geographical distribution reveals three interesting patterns. First, Sub-Saharan
Africa and the Middle East & North Africa are the two regions experiencing both the
deepest and longest declines. The depth in these regions is particularly striking in
comparison to the other regions. The mean decline is -37.1% in Sub-Saharan Africa
and -33.2% in the Middle East & North Africa, which is about double of the average
10
decline in Latin America & the Caribbean. The duration is longest in Sub-Saharan
Africa, with the median spell lasting 16 years and the mean spell lasting over 17 years.
Declines are shorter in the Middle East & North Africa, where the mean and median do
not exceed 9 years. Both regions also have the most censored/unfinished spells due to
their long duration. Second, countries in Latin America & the Caribbean experienced
slumps most frequently, but the average decline was only moderately deep and lasted for
about 5 years. Third, when comparing Eastern Europe & Central Asia to the East Asia
& Pacific region we find similar mean and median durations but much deeper slumps in
the former.11 As expected, there are comparatively few, short and mild declines in North
America, Europe (excluding Eastern Europe), and – more surprisingly – South Asia.
Overall, Table 1 suggests a relatively strong association of both the mean duration
and mean depth of the decline phase with different income levels. This is particularly
interesting, since we subsequently model these observed differences in duration between
high and low income economies with more fundamental factors such as institutions and
ethnic fractionalization. Furthermore, the table provides a preliminary indication that
there is substantial regional heterogeneity which will have to be taken into account in the
ensuing analysis.
For brevity and since most of the additional data sources are well-known, we do not
separately discuss the construction and summary statistics of the covariates used in the
following sections. We include four major categories of variables: 1) a variety of measures
for different aspects of institutions, politics and social conflict, 2) macroeconomic
indicators of prices, trade and exports, 3) a set of variables for domestic and international
finance, and 4) several other growth determinants (such as life expectancy or years of
schooling). Table 9 in Appendix C provides an exhaustive list of all variable names, data
sources and a basic set of summary statistics for the data used throughout the paper.
Not all data is necessarily satisfactory but, in some cases, simply the best available. For
example, we use the Polity IV database as our primary proxy for institutional development
because of a lack of other time series data capturing the characteristics of political and
economic institutions. Similarly, cross-country inequality data are notoriously flawed.
Inequality data are usually drawn from household surveys of varying quality whose
underlying welfare concepts are not strictly comparable. We rely on a data set compiled
by Solt (2009) that standardizes inequality measures obtained from various sources in
order to increase comparability and coverage. We describe other noteworthy features of
the data in the discussion of the results.
4 The anatomy of slumps
Do some covariates show a systematic pattern of change just before the downbreak and
after? Revealing the factors correlated with downbreaks serves two purposes. First, it
highlights the characteristics of the slumps in our sample. Second, it indicates which
variables may play a larger role in the duration analysis. In particular, we show that
there is evidence of (endogenous) institutional change occurring during slumps.
To study these questions we employ an event methodology often used in the literature
on currency and banking crises (Eichengreen et al., 1995; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999;
Gourinchas and Obstfeld, 2012). The basic idea is to use dummy variables indicating a
11This is clearly driven by a few Eastern European transition economies. In our sample, this only
refers to Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Poland.
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pre-defined imminence to the start of the slump as a means of detecting changes in the
relative mean of each time-varying covariate. Then, the coefficients of these “imminence
dummies” measure if and how much these covariates change around the time the slump
hits and their standard errors quantify the associated uncertainty.
We run the following regression for each time varying covariate (xit ∈ xit):
xit =
5∑
s=−5
δt,t̂b1+sβs + µi + it (3)
where δt,t̂b1+s is the Kronecker delta which is equal to one if t = t̂b1 +s and zero otherwise,
βs are coefficients, µi is an unobserved country effect and it is an idiosyncratic error term.
We set s ∈ [−5, 5], so that the result is an 11-year window around the break date t̂b1.
The first year of the slump is s = 1 or t = t̂b1 + 1.
The results are best reported visually by plotting the estimates of the coefficients
βs (including 95% confidence bands) as they represent the conditional expectation of the
covariate xit at time s relative to “normal” times.
12 In other words, we plot the country-
demeaned expectations of each indicator over 11 years around the downbreak (t̂b1).
We do not include time dummies to purge the cross-sectional dependence but allow the
point estimates to capture shocks common to all countries. Instead, we compute standard
errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation among both country and
time clusters using the formulas suggested by Thompson (2011) and Cameron et al.
(2011).13 The confidence bands thus allow for common year shocks in each of these
variables as well as within country correlation.
Figure 3 summarizes the evolution of output growth and (relative) prices. Before
the beginning of a slump, growth is only marginally elevated relative to normal times,
suggesting that – on average – the countries in our sample are not experiencing a growth
acceleration just before the downbreak occurs. In the first year of the slump, growth is
13.7% less relative to normal times and remains depressed in the five years after, varying
between -2% and -3% from years two to five. Similarly, an estimate of the output gap
also shows that growth is not exceptionally strong before a slump. The output gap is
close to normal levels during the four years preceding the downbreak. Then, once the
slump occurs, output remains below potential in the five years after the break and is still
1.3% below potential in year five. We use a standard Hodrick-Prescott filter to estimate
the output gap. HP filters have the downside of adjusting potential output downwards
relatively quickly in advance of large slumps, thus creating the artificial spike at s = 0.
Turning to consumer prices and exchange rates, Figure 3 shows that inflation is slightly
elevated in the five years before the downbreak but this trend is insignificant. However,
inflation strongly and significantly increases during the slump, peaking at 6-7% above
the median inflation rate during normal times in the first two years of decline. While this
12In this case, “normal” refers to all observations other than the 11 years around the downbreak. We
obtain the 2.5% (97.5%) critical value from a t-distribution with min(Gi, Gt) − 1 degrees of freedom,
where Gi is the number of country clusters and Gt is the number of time clusters.
13The authors show that robustness for two-way clustering can be achieved by calculating the variance-
covariance estimates (VCE) as follows: Vˆ [βˆ] = Vˆ i[βˆ] + Vˆ t[βˆ] − Vˆ i∩t[βˆ], where i denotes country-
clustered variances, t denotes time-clustered variances and, in the case of a panel, i∩ t indicates a White
heteroskedasticity-robust variance matrix. As noted by Cameron et al. (2011), the Vˆ [βˆ] matrix is not
always positive semi-definite even though its components are, which occurs often when using fixed effects
and clustering over the same units. We first within-transform the data to reduce the size of the VCE
matrix and then reconstruct it via a spectral recomposition with all negative eigenvalues set to zero.
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Figure 3 – Growth, Output Gap and Prices
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pattern is expected, it can have many causes, such as macroeconomic mismanagement or
rising import prices following an exchange rate devaluation. The estimates for inflation
are derived from median fixed-effects regressions with bootstrapped double-clustered
standard errors14 in order to reduce the influence of large outliers caused by episodes
of hyperinflation. Conversely, the real exchange rate – as measured by an undervaluation
index proposed by Rodrik (2008) – is overvalued relative to normal times in the five years
before the slump and when the slump hits, but then depreciates slowly towards normal
levels just after the downbreak. A large strand of the empirical growth literature argues
that overvaluation hurts growth prospects and may signal the advent of several types of
crises.15 Figure 3 suggests that there is some currency overvaluation in the run up to
crises, but the uncertainty associated with these estimates is (too) high.
What about trade and export performance? In the upper panel of Figure 4, we use
two measures of trade openness to capture whether the well-accepted principle that trade
openness is good for growth also holds in the reverse that less openness coincides with
the occurrence of slumps. The upward trend in the βs-coefficients for the de jure binary
14For the quantile regressions, we apply the results from Cameron et al. (2011) and Thompson (2011)
to bootstrapping. We estimate the following VCE matrix: Vˆ [βˆ]∗ = Vˆ i[βˆ]∗ + Vˆ t[βˆ]∗ − Vˆ i∩t[βˆ]∗, where
i denotes block sampling from countries, t denotes block sampling from years, i ∩ t denotes sampling
from country-years, and the superscript ‘∗’ refers to bootstrap quantities; this is an asymptotically valid
approach (Cameron et al., 2011, see in particular p. 243).
15In the “early warning signals” literature, overvaluation of the real exchange rate systematically
emerges as a robust predictor of financial, currency and banking crises (Eichengreen et al., 1995; Bussie`re
and Fratzscher, 2006; Gourinchas and Obstfeld, 2012; Frankel and Saravelos, 2012).
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Figure 4 – Trade & Exports I
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measure of trade openness proposed by Sachs and Warner (1995)16 suggests that the
probability of imposing trade restrictions is higher in the run up to a slump, relative to
normal times, and decreases thereafter. This effect is very significant and large, as the
estimates of the linear probability model indicate that a country is 12.4 to 14.1 percentage
points less likely to be open at any given year in the five years before the downbreak.
Interestingly, a comparable effect is not evident when examining de facto trade openness.
De facto (nominal) trade flows exhibit no systematic pattern during the 11-year window.
Two other variables behave similarly to de jure openness. The current account balance
is somewhat lower relative to normal times before the slump hits but then naturally
improves as the relative price of imports rises and export prices decline. This trend is
mirrored by the share of manufacturing exports in total exports, which is significantly
lower before the slump starts but increases continuously in the five years thereafter.
Figure 5 shows how other, more structural, measures of trade performance evolve
around the downbreak. A well-established empirical result is that terms of trade shocks
spur output volatility and could cause growth collapses (Rodrik, 1999). We measure
terms of trade shocks as the annual growth rate of the net barter terms of trade. For the
slumps in our sample, terms of trade shocks do not precede the downbreak on average,
but the terms of trade worsen markedly relative to normal times in the first two years of
the downturn (-9% and -4.4%). This effect is most likely due to a depreciating currency.
Next, we examine the structure of a country’s export portfolio. Narrow export baskets
could make countries more vulnerable to demand and supply shifts in just a few industries,
while countries with more diversified export baskets may be more insulated against such
16We use the updated version of their data as presented in Wacziarg and Welch (2008).
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Figure 5 – Trade & Exports II
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shocks. In line with this expectation, we find that the conditional expectation of export
diversification – measured as one minus the Herfindahl concentration index – is lower
before a slump begins and increases to normal level as it progresses. However, these
differences in means are insignificant. Further, Hausmann et al. (2007) suggest that higher
export sophistication (higher quality of the export basket) benefits growth directly. The
lower panel of Figure 5 examines this relationship. The first graph shows the conditional
expectation of the Hausmann et al. (2007) measure, which suggests that export baskets
are of less quality in the two years before the break but improve relative to normal
times from the year preceding the slump onwards. The second graph examines this
relationship in differences. Interestingly, the improvement in export sophistication after
the downbreak disappears. The relative movements in both levels and differences are not
significant at conventional levels.
Figures 6 and 7 show trends in several financial indicators. A widespread conception
is that financial globalization and financial development benefit growth by reducing
(consumption) volatility through lowering interest rates, broadening access to credit, and
better allocating resources across the domestic economy (and global economy). While
this notion draws on evidence from several empirical studies (e.g. King and Levine, 1993;
Beck et al., 2000), the question of causality is still unresolved and often found to run both
ways or work through indirect channels, such as technology spillovers or institutions. As
in the case of trade openness, we compare the findings from de jure financial openness
using an indicator of capital account restrictions (Chinn and Ito, 2006) and a measure of
de facto financial integration, as a country’s capital account may be open but real flows
are few and vice versa – for a discussion of this distinction see Kose et al. (2009).
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Three out of four indicators in Figure 6 are below their normal levels before the
slump occurs. The capital account is more restricted relative to normal times before the
slump occurs and restrictions increase further after the downbreak. Similarly, financial
integration, measured as the sum of all foreign assets and liabilities over GDP, is depressed
both before and after the downbreak. Liquid liabilities over GDP – an indicator of
financial depth – are significantly lower, by about -6 to -10 percentage points, in the
years before the crisis but then adjust upwards to normal levels. The upward drift in
financial depth and financial integration may be due the denominator (GDP) shrinking
faster than the assets and liabilities of the financial system. When examining the role of
more specific financial institutions using an indicator of financial development (Deposit
Money over Central Bank Assets), we find that financial development is higher before the
break date and then declines during the slump. This may be in part due to an expansion
of the Central Bank’s balance sheet, possibly coinciding with a contraction of deposit
money. However, almost none of these differences are significant at conventional levels.
Figure 6 – Finances I
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In the case of external balances the results are very clear (see Figure 7). Slumps do
not appear to be debt driven. External debt liabilities are very low relative to normal
times before the slump occurs, then increase by about 10 percentage points but still
remain lower than in normal times. However, this variation is measured with considerable
uncertainty.17 Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012) devise a leverage ratio for countries in an
empirical analogy to how leverage of firms is defined – a broader concept than just external
debt. Similarly to debt levels, this measure indicates that the countries in our sample are
17There are time trends involved in the build-up of debt. Using a two-way fixed effects model shifts
the curve up around zero at all event times in the 11-year window, supporting our conclusion.
16
significantly less reliant on external financing in the 11 year window than at normal times.
Not only is debt low, the stock of FDI liabilities is also about 8-10 percentage points lower
throughout the 11 year period relative to normal times, suggesting that periods before and
during slumps are associated with comparatively little FDI inflows (usually considered
particularly desirable and stable investment flows). Taken together, these graphs suggest
that most of the countries in our sample are not well integrated into global finance in the
run up to a slump. This is not surprising given that rapid financial globalization and
deeper financial integration of emerging markets occurs relatively late (1990s onwards).
Contrary to this pattern, private credit to GDP is depressed just before the slump, much
like financial depth. Hence, contractions in credit may indicate upcoming slumps.
Figure 7 – Finances II
−
10
0
−
50
50
0
−5 −4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5
s
External Debt Liabilities (% of GDP)
−
40
−
20
20
0
−5 −4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5
s
External Leverage
−
15
−
10
−
5
0
−5 −4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5
s
FDI Liabilities (% of GDP)
−
20
−
10
10
20
0
−5 −4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5
s
Private Credit (% of GDP)
Figure 8 shows graphs describing how certain institutional and political dynamics evolve
around the downbreak. In many ways, these results are the most remarkable of this
section. The Polity score is much lower before a slump occurs, but increases towards
normal levels thereafter. In the five years before a slump, the conditional expectation
is between 2.5 and 3.1 points lower than in normal times and until the break date
these differences are significant at the 5%-level. This suggests that prior deficiencies
in institutions increase vulnerability to slumps and institutions improve during/ after
slumps occur. All the subcomponents of the combined Polity score, including constraints
on the executive, exhibit very similar trends (not shown, available on request). Conversely,
the ICRG’s 6-point corruption indicator shows a moderate, yet insignificant, decrease
in corruption in the first two years of a slump. The ICRG series also suffers from low
coverage; it begins only in 1984 while a majority of the slumps in our sample start earlier.
The pattern of institutional reform is confirmed by the time profile of the probabilities
17
Figure 8 – Institutions & Politics
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of negative or positive regime changes, measured as a minimum three-point downward
or upward change in the Polity score. There is little evidence that negative regime
changes precede downbreaks or systematically occur thereafter. What is very interesting,
however, is an upward trend in the probability of positive regime changes from the eve
of the slump onwards. In the first and second year of a slump, the probability is 10-12%
higher than in normal times. While these point estimates are individually significant, the
sequence of positive estimates is even more convincing. In sum, slumps are preceded by
weak institutions. However, they also present windows of opportunity as sharply negative
growth creates room for political and economic reforms. A bold interpretation would be
that given prior institutional deficiencies, slumps bring about a form of creative political
destruction by altering power relations and increasing the pressure on governments to
pursue institutional change (North et al., 2009).18
Figure 9 shows a set of complementary measures which are sometimes interpreted as
the degree of open or latent social conflict challenging the conflict management capacity
of a country’s institutions. The picture these indicators present is mixed. Inequality, as
measured by the Gini coefficient, is not significantly higher than normal before or after
the downbreak. This is not too surprising. On the one hand, income inequality is a deeply
rooted social phenomenon implying that we typically see few swift changes. On the other
18This is a common theme in the literature on the political economy of institutions. Weak institutions
can be the cause of declining overall wealth, by providing incentives to seek rents. At the same time,
declining wealth may bring about political realignments as the bargaining position of actors changes. See
among many others Acemoglu et al. (2004), Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), and North et al. (2009).
Greif and Laitin (2004) go even further and argue that equilibrium institutions are self-undermining if
they do not continuously broaden the set of situations in which they are supported.
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Figure 9 – Social & Political Conflict
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hand, even if we expect inequality to respond to crises, it is not clear which part of the
income distribution will be most affected. Crises do not necessarily just hit the poor but
may also have large negative effects on capital incomes and other types of income, so
that “churning” under the surface can make the overall impact on the Gini ambiguous.
However, this finding does not preclude that differing levels of initial inequality could be
associated with the duration of declines.
Next, we examine three additional indicators of outright conflict. The variable
irregular ‘leader exit’ measures coups d’e´tats, assassinations, but also deaths of leaders
in office and other forms of abrupt government changes that could tip an institutionally
weak country into crisis (Goemans et al., 2009). Figure 9 illustrates that the probability
of an irregular exit is higher relative to normal times prior to the first year of the slump,
but these differences are statistically insignificant. Political turmoil is thus at best weakly
linked to subsequent crises. Outright wars or major conflicts19 between state and non-
state actors are another extreme form of social conflict that could in many ways destroy
the economic base of a country, cause slumps to occur, and could prolong their duration.
In fact, we find wars do not coincide with slumps. The probability of war increases from
the eve of the slump onwards, yet there is no indication that – on average – wars tip
countries into slumps. The effect is even weaker when we use a lower threshold designed
to capture low intensity conflicts20 such as ongoing civil strife and other forms of sectarian
violence. There is a slight upward trend from two years after the downbreak onwards,
19Defined as any armed conflict coded as ‘war’ in the PRIO Armed Conflict Database; that is, any
ongoing conflict with 1,000 battle related deaths in any given year.
20War/Conflict (any) is coded as unity if there are at least 25 battle related deaths in any given year.
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but the coefficients are both quantitatively small and statistically insignificant.
To summarize, this section outlined the characteristics of slumps and identified several
factors associated with the decline phase.21 Many indicators and economic aggregates
evolve in the expected manner but often represent a mix of endogenous policy responses.
For example, higher inflation, a depreciating real exchange rate and a re-balancing of
the current account are both testament of the strong price pressures faced by these
economies but also of the necessary adjustments that ultimately help to stabilize the
downturn. Other covariates behave in interesting ways around the break date. The
difference between de facto trade flows and de jure openness is striking and suggests
that trade restrictions play an important role for the occurrence of slumps. Additionally,
several indicators of exports, financial development and financial integration either switch
means around the time the slump hits or remain permanently below the levels of normal
times throughout. While this exercise could certainly be extended further with more
policy variables, the most interesting and unexpected finding is a switch from significantly
lower quality institutions in the run up to a slump back to better scores occurring in the
first two years after the downbreak. This indicates that weaker institutions precede
the beginning of a slump, while the slump itself offers a window of opportunity for
institutional improvements, and thus illustrates the endogenous nature of reforms.
5 The duration of declines
Methodology
There are two major approaches to dealing with duration data: semi-parametric Cox
models and parametric models. Cox models form so-called risk sets of the subjects in
the sample at the observed event times and then compute the probability of the event of
interest occurring in each particular risk set. The main advantage of Cox regression is
that the so-called baseline hazard can have any shape (as long as the conditional hazard
is proportional). Parametric models, on the contrary, require more explicit assumptions
about the shape of the baseline hazard but in turn also allow more detailed predictions.
We take a parametric approach. Parametric models can either be cast as proportional
hazard (PH) or as accelerated failure time (AFT) models. PH models directly begin
with a log-linear specification of the hazard function. In other words, they model the
instantaneous probability of an event occurring at a particular time conditional on the
event not having occurred before. Proportionality then implies that the hazard function
for each subject in the sample is a multiple of the baseline; that is, the baseline hazard
is scaled up and down by the different realizations of the covariates. From the hazard
function, we can derive the survival function which captures the cumulative probability
of the event not having occurred until the observed time. The event of interest is usually
defined as the ‘exit’ from an ‘initial state’. In our case, the ‘initial state’ corresponds
to the decline phase and ‘exit’ corresponds to entering the recovery phase. If a country
is observed to exit the decline phase at some time, we estimate the probability of the
recovery starting at that particular time (conditional on the decline phase lasting until
that time). If there is no observed exit from the decline phase, then the observation is
censored and only the survival probability enters the likelihood. AFT models describe the
21We do not attempt to “explain” the onset of crises in this paper. For such an analysis see the ‘early
warning signals’ literature cited in the text, but also Bluhm et al. (2012).
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same relationships but begin with a log-linear model of time itself. Hence, AFT models
closely resemble linear regression. The hazard function and survival function are then
characterized indirectly by the distribution of the error terms in the log-linear model.
All parametric models assume a certain shape of the baseline hazard. The exponential
model assumes that the hazard is constant over the entire duration process. Models
with a Weibull or Gompertz distribution allow for flat, monotonically increasing or
monotonically decreasing hazard rates. Log-normal and log-logistic models provide a
non-monotonic function that is first increasing and then decreasing. Alternatively, the
generalized gamma distribution is very flexible and encompasses the exponential, Weibull
and log-normal distributions but is more demanding to estimate.
We have no strong theoretical prior that the hazard function must follow a particular
shape. We may expect some countries to exit rather quickly and others to take longer, but
it is difficult to determine ex ante if remaining in the decline phase for very long leads to
a deterioration of fundamentals and thus a decreasing hazard, or if the probability of exit
is actually increasing because countries are bound to enter the recovery phase eventually.
Figure 10 – Unconditional Survival and Hazard Functions
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Note(s): The Kaplan-Meier survival curve is a non-parametric estimate of the probability of remaining in the decline
state at each unit of analysis time. 95% confidence intervals are shown in grey. The corresponding hazard function
has been smoothed using a Gaussian kernel with boundary adjustment and bandwidth 3.
Figure 10 shows the non-parametric Kaplan-Meier estimate of the unconditional survival
function and the corresponding (smoothed) Gaussian hazard function. About 47% of the
spells in our sample end after only two years of decline, but the probability of exiting
the decline phase steeply and monotonically decreases over time. Nevertheless, the shape
of the conditional hazard (with covariates) may be very different. We take a flexible
approach by first relying on a log-normal parameterization and then testing the robustness
of our preferred specification under different distributional assumptions. It is important
to note that the log-normal model does not imply proportionality of the conditional
hazard function. Hence, it can only be represented in the AFT metric. We provide a
more detailed description of how log-normal AFT models are estimated in Appendix D.
Let analysis time be t˜, where t˜ ≡ t − t0 and t0 = t̂b1, so that we can refer to the
calendar times t and t0 when necessary. The last observed duration is t˜D = tˆmin − t̂b1.
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We specify the following duration process in AFT form:
ln t˜ ≡ ln(t− t0) = α + βINS0 + γELF + x′0ξ + z′tζ + t (4)
where INS0 is a measure of institutions fixed at t0, ELF is a time-invariant measure of
ethnic fractionalization, x0 = (x0,1, x0,2, . . . , x0,k) is a k×1 vector of covariates fixed at t0,
zt = (zt,1, zt,2, . . . , zt,m) is an m × 1 vector of strictly exogenous time-varying covariates,
and – for the log-normal model – t is distributed N (0, σ). All parameters, including σ,
are estimated with Maximum Likelihood (ML) and, as usual, we assume that censoring
is independent of the duration. Our coefficients of interest are β and γ. We suppress the
country-spell index to simplify the exposition.
The estimated coefficients represent semi-elasticities of the expected duration with
respect to the covariates, or elasticities if the covariate is in logs. The term ‘accelerated
failure time’ derives from the interpretation of the implied effects. If the coefficient of the
covariate is positive, then the expected duration until the event is prolonged by larger
realizations of the covariate. In our case, this is equivalent to delayed exit from the
decline phase (later start of the recovery). If the coefficient is negative, then the expected
duration is shortened and the recovery will start earlier.
A complication of using time-varying covariates is possible feedback running from the
duration to the covariates. If such feedback occurs, the estimated coefficients are biased
and the usual test statistics are invalid (Lancaster, 1990; Kalbfleisch and Prentice, 2002).
Joint modeling of the covariate and the duration outcomes can sometimes achieve valid
inference in the presence of feedback, but with multiple endogenous regressors this quickly
becomes a daunting task. In order to avoid such problems altogether, we simply take the
last pre-slump value of all potentially endogenous covariates at t0, including our measure
of institutions. Hence, we close the feedback channel running from longer declines to, say,
weaker institutions and rule out simultaneous causality. This is particularly important
given that the previous section showed that positive institutional reforms occur during
crises. In addition to the time-invariant measure of ethnic fractionalization, only the real
US interest rate is assumed to be strictly exogenous.
Countries can have several recurrent slumps. This is a minor concern in our
application, since only 8 of the 58 spells in our data are not the first spell for a given
country. In order to account for the dependence of the parameter estimates across spells
of the same country, we allow their variances to be correlated using the standard sandwich
estimator of the variance-covariance matrix. As this procedure assumes that the sequence
of repeated spells does not matter, we show in the robustness section that our results
hold when this assumption is relaxed.
Dealing with a maximum of only 48 exits in 58 decline spells over the entire period
of 1950 to 2008 requires a careful approach to model selection. The maximum sample
size is statistically large enough to identify reasonably robust results, but we match
these episodes with data over the almost six decades spanned by them. Including many
covariates with different patterns of missing data then easily leads to sample sizes that are
too small by conventional standards. Even at more moderate sample sizes, care needs to
be taken to guard against overfitting.22 To arrive at a parsimonious model specification,
we employ a two-step approach. First, we fit variable-by-variable regressions including
only a minimal set of controls and select a smaller set of covariates for the second step
22Overfitting occurs when there are too many variables relative to the number of observations. An
often used rule of thumb is to have at least five failures (exits) per variable.
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based on statistical significance (p-value < .1). In other words, we select only those
variables exhibiting a sufficiently strong correlation with the duration of declines. For
brevity, we defer the results of the first step to Appendix E. Second, using the smaller
set of covariates, we proceed with conventional model building by extending our base
specification in several ways and examining its robustness. A similar approach has been
used by Berg et al. (2012) who studied the duration of growth accelerations.
Results
We now directly turn to several sets of summary regressions. Our base specification always
includes executive constraints as a measure of institutions, a measure of ethno-linguistic
fractionalization, initial GDP per capita, the real US interest rate, and a constant.
Constraints on the executive is our preferred proxy of institutional quality for two reasons.
First, it is widely used in the empirical literature as a measure of institutional constraints
placed on political actors and has already been linked to macroeconomic volatility (e.g.
Acemoglu et al., 2003; Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005). Second, it is more conceptually
rooted in the economic theory of institutions than any of the broader measures capturing
wider aspects of the political regime (e.g. democracy or autocracy). Controlling for
initial GDP matters, as executive constraints are correlated with the level of development
(correlation: ρ = 0.43), and both potentially determine the duration of declines.
For fractionalization, we use a measure from Desmet et al. (2012), who recently
developed a very detailed set of estimates of ethnic cleavages. They compute the
probability that two randomly chosen individuals in a country belong to different
ethno-linguistic groups at 15 levels of ‘the language tree’. Thus this new measure of
fractionalization captures the historical nature of ethnic and linguistic differentiation
into increasingly narrower groups over time. We use two variables at both extremes
of the spectrum, which we could not include in Section 4 due to their time-invariant
nature. ELF1 is the most aggregate level, capturing only crude distinctions such as Indo-
European versus non-Indo European languages. ELF15 represents the most disaggregate
level, differentiating among the language groups known today. Desmet et al. (2012) show
that aggregate fractionalization matters more for civil conflict while the disaggregate level
strongly predicts growth differentials. Hence, we use the latter as our primary measure.
The variable selection results reported in Appendix E show that the basic correlations
are as expected. Stronger institutions and higher initial GDP are associated with shorter
declines. Conversely, a higher degree of fractionalization and increases in the US interest
rate predict longer declines. Next, we present three sets of estimations to examine if
these findings are robust to the inclusion of additional variables. First, we examine
how the effects of institutions and fractionalization change when other variables are
added. Second, we present a set of results using our preferred specification as a base
but adding other variables in thematic groups. Third, we show an expanded set of
summary regressions highlighting the non-linearities involved in the effects of institutions
and fractionalization on the duration of declines – a feature that has received too little
attention in the empirical literature so far.
Table 2 reports the first set of summary regressions. The table is organized as
follows. We enter each variable that passed the variable selection process separately
into the specification in order to examine how its presence changes the coefficients of
institutions and fractionalization. All variables, except de facto trade openness, enter
with the expected sign. The broad patterns are very interesting. Above all, the effect of
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fractionalization is extremely robust in all but one model23 and varies only within a narrow
band. A one percentage point increase in fractionalization is estimated to prolong the
decline phase by about 1-2%. Further, the coefficient of executive constraints is significant
at the 5% or 1%-level in a majority of the regressions and has a stable negative sign
throughout. Most models imply that a one point improvement in executive constraints
leads to 13-18% reduction in the duration of the decline phase. However, the coefficient
becomes small when we control for export sophistication, private credit to GDP, and
financial depth – in each case, we lose roughly half the sample. Due to the smaller
sample size, the standard error of executive constraints also widens substantially when
controlling for the share of manufactures in total exports or inequality, but the coefficient
remains similar. In the case of export sophistication and the two financial variables, two
factors could be driving the changes in the coefficient on institutions: sample selection and
endogeneity/ multicollinearity. We find that in all three cases, sample selection is only
partially responsible24 but that there are strong grounds to suspect that both the ability
to produce more sophisticated exports and sustain a complex financial system must first
be preceded by well-developed institutions (correlation: ρ ∈ [0.56; 0.62]). In fact, we can
characterize these complex features of modern economies as outcomes of institutional
development and do not interpret this as a lack of robustness (e.g., see Acemoglu et al.,
2003, for a similar point and additional evidence).
Interestingly, the coefficient of the log of GDP per capita just before the slump
consistently has a positive sign once we control for our covariates of interest, implying
the counterintuitive result that higher initial GDP prolongs declines. Yet, as the single-
variable models in Table 10 of the Appendix show, higher initial GDP is unconditionally
associated with shorter declines but insignificantly so (p-value = 0.39) and initial GDP
adds little explanatory power to the constant-only model. In Table 2 and all subsequent
models, the coefficients and standard errors of initial GDP remain very unstable. The
implied elasticities of the duration with respect to initial GDP range from 0.06 to 0.89,
depending on the sample size and the controls. While we do not exclude initial GDP
from our models in order to not spuriously assign its effect to institutions, we only treat
it as a control variable and do not attempt to give its effect a causal interpretation.
Several of the variables that passed the selection step have effects that are not robust
in a multivariate setting. The coefficients of the share of manufactured exports, export
diversification, and inequality point in the expected direction but are insignificant by
a large margin. The results also help to determine which of the two measures of
fractionalization should be preferred in our context. Complementing the results of
Desmet et al. (2012), we find that when controlling for both the disaggregate and
aggregate measures of fractionalization at the same time, the disaggregate measure
(ELF15) captures more of the relevant variation in the duration of declines. All of the
‘other determinants’, that is, life expectancy, infant mortality and years of schooling, are
insignificant in the expanded models and have hardly any effect on the partial effects of
institutions or fractionalization.
Table 3 takes a different approach to addressing the issue of omitted variables. Instead
of adding variables one-by-one, we now add groups of variables measuring similar yet
23When also controlling for export diversification, we lose nearly half the sample and the coefficient
of ELF15 becomes small and insignificant. However, the sign remains stable and the standard error
increases only marginally.
24The size and significance of executive constraints weakens somewhat when the estimation sample is
restricted to be the same as if either of these three variables were included.
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Table 3 – Summary Models II
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables ln t˜ ln t˜ ln t˜ ln t˜ ln t˜ ln t˜
Executive Constraints (INS0) -0.181*** -0.149 -0.007 -0.172*** -0.111* -0.178***
(0.066) (0.102) (0.075) (0.063) (0.064) (0.058)
Fractionalization (ELF15) 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.019*** 0.016*** 0.014*** 0.016***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Initial ln GDP per capita 0.282** 1.014*** 0.293** 0.559*** 0.459*** 0.197*
(0.125) (0.290) (0.132) (0.171) (0.164) (0.106)
Real US Interest Rate 0.063 0.065 0.098* 0.081* 0.074* 0.087*
(0.044) (0.073) (0.054) (0.044) (0.042) (0.048)
Trade Openness (de jure) -0.772**
(0.312)
Trade Openness (de facto) 0.010**
(0.005)
Manufactures (% Exports) -0.007
(0.010)
Export Diversification -0.003
(0.012)
Export Sophistication -1.559**
(0.777)
Financial Depth -0.007
(0.013)
Private Credit -0.011
(0.008)
Infant Mortality 0.003
(0.009)
Life Expectancy -0.020
(0.038)
Education (All) -0.026
(0.074)
Constant -1.411 6.637 -1.346 -2.426 -3.346** -0.553
(0.989) (4.802) (1.035) (2.633) (1.401) (0.868)
Region FE NO NO NO NO YES NO
Exits 42 18 25 45 47 47
Spells 51 22 32 55 57 57
Years of Decline 314 166 193 325 346 346
Log-L -59.259 -22.668 -36.422 -65.321 -63.827 -72.090
Pseudo-R2 0.248 0.277 0.218 0.211 0.263 0.168
Note(s): The standard errors are clustered on the country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
different aspects of a certain theme, such as trade or finance. Most of the previous
results are confirmed, but Table 3 also introduces a few refinements. First and foremost,
the effect of ethno-linguistic fractionalization remains very robust. Second, interesting
patterns emerge for the three groups of macroeconomic variables. Model (1) shows that de
jure trade openness still holds substantial explanatory power over the expected duration
and de facto openness continues to have a significant and positive effect, yet both of these
covariates have little effect on the coefficients and the standard errors of institutions and
fractionalization. Model (2) highlights that the coefficients of executive constraints and
fractionalization are actually robust to the inclusion of export sophistication once the
share of manufactured exports and the degree of export diversification are also included.
Only the standard error of executive constraints increases substantially due to the smaller
sample size. For the financial variables, model (3) reveals that including private credit and
financial depth still reduces the coefficient of executive constraints substantially. However,
the partial effects of these variables are not very robust and provide no evidence in favor of
retaining these variables in the model.25 Model (4) confirms that neither life expectancy,
25This also applies to many other models where more controls are used in addition to one of the
financial measures.
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infant mortality, or schooling have robust effects on the expected duration.
We take a different approach to addressing the issue of omitted variables in model
(5) by including region dummies to account for regionally shared heterogeneity that is
otherwise not captured by the observed covariates. Both the coefficients and standard
errors of institutions and fractionalization are within the usual range, providing further
support for the assertion that the effect of institutions is reasonably robust. Model
(6) in the last column is our preferred and most parsimonious specification. This model
captures most of the effects we are interested in and is estimated using nearly all available
observations. Taken together, these models show that the effect of fractionalization is
very robust and the effect of institutions is only strongly affected by the financial depth
and credit – two measures that we consider to be observed institutional outcomes.
Figure 11 – Predicted survival functions
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Are the effects of institutions economically meaningful? Figure 11 examines this point by
plotting the survival functions predicted by our preferred specification over four different
values of executive constraints (while keeping all other variables at their sample mean).
As is readily observed, the effect of institutions on the expected duration is very large
but plausible. In the log-normal model, the estimates of mean and median duration
are equivalent and can be easily estimated by the exponentiated linear prediction.26
Conditional on having entered a slump, a country with the lowest score on the executive
constraints measure is expected to decline for about 9.1 years, while a country with the
highest score is expected to decline only for about 3.1 years. The mean of executive
constraints in the estimation sample is about 2.4, implying a duration of 7.1 years.
As a last set of summary results, Table 4 reproduces Table 3 with one important
change. Instead of imposing that institutions and fractionalization have a linearly additive
effect on the expected duration of declines, we now allow for an interaction effect between
the two. The rationale for this is simple. Given a political economy in which (latent)
social conflict challenges the ability of political actors to take coordinated action, stronger
institutions may help to overcome this negative effect. However, countries with a high
26This is a special property of the log-normal model, due to the symmetry of the error distribution.
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degree of fractionalization may require particularly strong institutions just to compensate.
Likewise, countries with much greater degree of ethno-linguistic homogeneity may make
do with less developed institutions to achieve a similar degree of social coordination.
This hypothesis is a less restrictive variant of the idea that there is a multiplicative effect
between social conflict and institutions in response to external shocks (Rodrik, 1999).27
Table 4 – Summary Models III
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables ln t˜ ln t˜ ln t˜ ln t˜ ln t˜ ln t˜
Executive Constraints (I˜NS0) -0.366*** -0.137 -0.091 -0.280*** -0.217** -0.288***
(0.098) (0.126) (0.101) (0.090) (0.087) (0.080)
Fractionalization (E˜LF15) 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.019*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.018***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
I˜NS0 × E˜LF15 -0.005*** 0.000 -0.003 -0.004** -0.003** -0.004***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Initial ln GDP per capita 0.275** 1.007*** 0.238* 0.533*** 0.439*** 0.198*
(0.123) (0.293) (0.135) (0.175) (0.163) (0.106)
Real US Interest Rate 0.068 0.064 0.100* 0.084* 0.076* 0.098**
(0.042) (0.072) (0.054) (0.043) (0.042) (0.047)
Trade Openness (de jure) -0.690**
(0.298)
Trade Openness (de facto) 0.015***
(0.005)
Manufactures (% Exports) -0.008
(0.012)
Export Diversification -0.004
(0.011)
Export Sophistication -1.503*
(0.784)
Private Credit -0.008
(0.009)
Financial Depth -0.008
(0.011)
Infant Mortality 0.001
(0.007)
Life Expectancy -0.020
(0.030)
Education (All) -0.045
(0.070)
Constant -1.122 6.940 0.213 -1.425 -2.552* 0.025
(0.910) (4.896) (1.247) (2.066) (1.362) (0.872)
Region FE NO NO NO NO YES NO
Exits 42 18 25 45 47 47
Spells 51 22 32 55 57 57
Years of Decline 314 166 193 325 346 346
Log-L -54.001 -22.648 -35.514 -62.746 -61.681 -69.540
Pseudo-R2 0.315 0.278 0.238 0.243 0.288 0.197
Note(s): The standard errors are clustered on the country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
In order to ease the interpretation, we subtract the sample average of the institutions
and fractionalization variables from their observed values before estimating each model.
We denote the demeaned variables by I˜NS0 and E˜LF15. This has the following effect.
If either one of the two variables is at its mean, then the interaction term is zero and the
only relevant coefficient is the non-interacted variant. As a result, the coefficient of the
executive constraints variable directly measures the effect of institutions at the average
level of fractionalization, and vice versa. For values other than the mean, the coefficient
on the interaction term needs to be taken into account.
27Rodrik (1999) shows that such a multiplicative effect exists when looking at growth differentials,
but does not include the base categories, which very different to a non-linear interaction as we suggest.
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Table 4 shows that there is considerable evidence of an interaction effect. In the
same models where we find a robust effect of institutions, we also find a significant
interaction effect between executive constraints and ethno-linguistic fractionalization. In
most specifications, the partial effect of one variable at the mean of the other is at least
as significant as in the models without an interaction effect. The interaction term is
negative and significant at the 1%-level in all versions but models (2) and (3). In model
(2) there is simply not enough data to estimate this effect, whereas in model (3) the sign
and size of the interaction coefficient is actually very similar to other estimations. Since
our preferred specification is nested in model (6), testing the null that the interaction
term is zero is equivalent to a test that this model fits the data better. A likelihood ratio
test also prefers the interaction model and the pseudo-R2 improves from 0.168 to 0.197.
Figure 12 – Partial Effects in Interaction Model
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Note(s): The partial effects are based on the preferred specification in Table 4 and are computed over the entire range
of the variable on the x-axis while keeping all other regressors at their mean.
Figure 12 illustrates that the effects estimated in the interaction model are economically
and statistically significant. It plots the predicted semi-elasticities of the expected
duration with respect to one variable of the interaction term over representative values
of the other, including a 95% confidence interval. Three points stand out: 1) the effect of
executive constrains clearly depends on fractionalization (and vice versa), 2) both partial
effects are significant over most of the distribution, and 3) both partial effects consistently
have the expected sign. The sampling distribution of executive constraints covers the
entire theoretical range (scores 1 to 7) and ethno-linguistic fractionalization ranges
from near perfect homogeneity (0.07) to near perfect fractionalization (96). The model
predictions now cover a wider range of the observed data. At the average score of executive
constraints, a country with the highest (lowest) degree of ethnic heterogeneity is expected
to decline for about 12.6 years (2.1 years). Hence, it would be difficult to understand
the effects of institutions without considering fractionalization. Stronger institutions also
have the potential to overcome the adverse effects of high levels of ethnic fractionalization.
At the 75th percentile of ethnic heterogeneity (ELF15 = 89.7), a country with the
highest (lowest) score of executive constraints is expected to decline for about 1.8 years
(18.3 years). Interestingly, the model suggests that the duration prolonging effect of
fractionalization is relatively small at high levels of executive constraints (INS0 ∈ [6; 7]).
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Robustness
We briefly illustrate that our main conclusions are unaffected by the choice of the
baseline hazard, presence of unobserved heterogeneity, exclusion of influential groups
of observations, and different ways of accounting for recurrent spells. For this purpose,
we run a battery of statistical tests and discuss how the choice of hazard shape relates
to the time process implied by the different models.
Table 5 tackles the issues of choice of functional form and model selection. To aid
a direct comparison, we report our preferred specification in the first column and then
show estimates of the same model using with five different hazard functions. Model (2)
uses a log-logistic hazard instead of the log-normal shape, but the parameter estimates
do not change much. This is not too surprising. The log-logistic distribution is very
similar to the log-normal, in that it offers a non-monotonic shape that is either first
increasing and then decreasing or monotonically decreasing throughout. This model has
an additional parameter (γ) indicating which is the case. The estimated shape parameter
(ln γ) is negative, implying that the hazard is first increasing then decreasing just as in
the log-normal model. The log-likelihood is close to that of model (1) but not better,
indicating a similar or, at best, minimally worse fit.
Table 5 – Robustness: functional form
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log-normal Log-logistic Exponential Weibull Gompertz Cox PH
Variables ln t˜ ln t˜ ln t˜ ln t˜ ln t˜ ln t˜
Coefficients Hazard Ratios (H0 : HR = 1)
Executive Constraints (INS0) -0.178*** -0.185*** 1.229*** 1.263*** 1.222*** 1.221***
(0.058) (0.067) (0.074) (0.089) (0.071) (0.082)
Fractionalization (ELF15) 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.978*** 0.974*** 0.979*** 0.979***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006)
Initial ln GDP per capita 0.197* 0.235** 0.787 0.765 0.786* 0.768
(0.106) (0.112) (0.119) (0.146) (0.113) (0.137)
Real US Interest Rate 0.087* 0.084* 0.947 0.928 0.949 0.951
(0.048) (0.051) (0.058) (0.061) (0.057) (0.064)
lnσ (Log-normal) -0.065
(0.093)
ln γ (Log-logistic) -0.580***
(0.105)
ln p (Weibull) 1.219**
(0.107)
γ (Gompertz) 0.985
(0.030)
Constant -0.553 -0.856 1.830 1.723 1.928
(0.868) (0.901) (2.432) (2.884) (2.448)
Exits 47 47 47 47 47 47
Spells 57 57 57 57 57 57
Years of Decline 346 346 346 346 346 346
Log-L -72.090 -73.286 -75.295 -73.940 -75.192 -143.142
AIC 156.180 158.571 160.590 159.879 162.384 294.285
Pseudo-R2 0.168 0.164 0.208 0.210 0.160 0.088
Note(s): The standard errors are clustered on the country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Models (3) to (6) in Table 5 have a different interpretation than all of the AFT models
shown previously. We no longer report coefficients but instead hazard ratios, since
these models are proportional hazards (PH) models by nature. Only the Weibull and
exponential distribution also have an equivalent AFT formulation. Hazard ratios are
interpreted as follows. A hazard ratio greater than one implies a higher instantaneous
probability of exiting the decline. A hazard ratio smaller than one implies a lower
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instantaneous probability of exiting the decline. Model (3) is the exponential or constant
hazard model. Here too, the results are quantitatively and qualitatively very similar
(given the altered interpretation), but the log-likelihood decreases somewhat and we
have no reason to suspect a constant hazard. Model (4) uses a Weibull parametrization
which allows for monotonically increasing or decreasing hazard rates. This model also
has a shape parameter (p) which allows testing for a constant hazard and, if constancy
is rejected, indicates whether the rate increases or decreases. A Wald test of the null
hypothesis that ln p = 0 rejects. However, contrary to all other parameterizations, the
Weibull model suggests that the baseline hazard is increasing over time. The Gompertz
model in column five also suggests a shape that is monotonically decreasing (γ < 0).
Which hazard shape fits the data best and is more intuitive? The question of fit is
easily answered by the Akaike information criterion (AIC) which is commonly used for
comparing non-nested models. The AIC is lowest for the log-normal model, confirming
our choice. However, this does not tell us what the underlying baseline hazard looks like.
In model (6), we specify a semi-parametric Cox model which does not restrict the shape
of the baseline hazard. The Cox model also suggests that the probability of exiting a
spell first increases very briefly and then decreases monotonically. This lends itself to
the following interpretation. In the first few years of a decline, countries are suffering
from a harsh but possibly temporary shock. Some countries are able to recover quickly.
However, the longer the decline lasts, the more economic fundamentals deteriorate making
it increasingly difficult to enter the recovery.
Table 6 – Robustness: heterogeneity, dropping regions, and multiple failures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Full No SSA No MNA No LAC No multiple PWP multiple
Variables ln t˜ ln t˜ ln t˜ ln t˜ ln t˜ ln t˜
Executive Constraints (INS0) -0.161*** -0.159*** -0.199*** -0.189** -0.199*** 1.263***
(0.061) (0.055) (0.071) (0.074) (0.064) (0.096)
Fractionalization (ELF15) 0.012** 0.005 0.018*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.981***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006)
Initial ln GDP per capita 0.213* 0.358*** 0.263* 0.179 0.196* 0.759
(0.111) (0.101) (0.139) (0.115) (0.111) (0.137)
Real US Interest Rate 0.091** 0.103** 0.066 0.090 0.086 0.940
(0.039) (0.042) (0.048) (0.065) (0.060) (0.067)
Constant -0.767 -1.843** -1.055 -0.393 -0.405
(0.943) (0.936) (1.063) (0.870) (0.900)
VCE – cluster cluster cluster cluster cluster
Frailties shared – – – – –
Strata – – – – – spell #
Exits 47 40 43 34 40 47
Spells 57 44 50 43 50 57
Years of Decline 346 178 294 271 312 346
Log-L -71.867 -50.584 -64.255 -54.643 -63.715 -123.435
Pseudo-R2 0.111 0.151 0.163 0.172 0.162 0.095
Note(s): In models (2) to (6), the standard errors are clustered on the country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Next, we turn to the issues of heterogeneity, influential observations and recurrent spells.
The previous section has already shown that the effects in our preferred specification
are robust to the inclusion of regional fixed-effects. Model (1) in Table 6 goes a step
further and includes country-level effects in the model. Each country now has an
unobserved effect or so-called gamma distributed frailty. These frailties are the duration
analysis equivalent of random effects in linear models. The term frailty derives from the
notion that a subject may be more ‘frail’ than the average, that is, more disposed to
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experiencing a certain event than others. As always, these random effects are assumed to
be uncorrelated with any of the other included covariates (which is unlikely). Our results
are robust to allowing for this type of country-specific heterogeneity.28
Models (2) to (4) examine if any of our main results are driven by specific regions
with particularly long slumps. We address this issue by re-estimating our preferred model
multiple times, each time removing one of the three regions with the longest spells. Model
(2) drops all declines in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and reveals an interesting additional
finding. While the coefficient of fractionalization (ELF15) is very robust in the previous
models, its size and significance is clearly driven by African observations. Without those,
the coefficient keeps the same sign but shrinks substantially and becomes insignificant
at conventional levels, while the partial effect of institutions remains significant. Since
Sub-Saharan Africa has the greatest ethno-linguistic heterogeneity of all regions, this
result is not too surprising.29 The interaction model proposed earlier may thus be more
relevant to understanding the effects of institutions and fractionalization in Africa than
elsewhere. On the other hand, models (3) and (4) show that the parameter estimates are
not sensitive to excluding either the entire Middle East and North Africa (MNA) or all
of Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC).
Until now, we assumed that multiple spells of the same type can be treated as
interchangeable. The last two columns of Table 6 investigate if this relatively strong
form of conditional independence is a reasonable assumption. Model (5) shows that
our findings are robust to excluding all spells other than the first, which rules out any
dependency across recurrent spells. The coefficient of executive constraints becomes
even larger and the effect of fractionalization is virtually unchanged. Model (6) takes a
different approach and specifies a conditional risk set model or stratified Cox model due to
Prentice et al. (1981, PWP). The model accounts for ordering of the events but assumes
that a subject cannot experience another event until the previous event has occurred.
In our case, this is a natural assumption, as – by definition – a country cannot exit a
second decline phase before having left the first and so on. Again, the results remain
qualitatively and quantitatively similar, although the reported hazard ratios cannot be
directly compared to the coefficients of the log-normal model.
In sum, we find that a log-normal hazard shape is not only a flexible assumption but
offers an intuitive interpretation of the baseline hazard and fits the data best. Further,
our main findings are robust to allowing for a restricted form of unobserved heterogeneity,
dropping of influential regions, and accounting for dependency among recurrent events.
An important additional insight is that the effect of fractionalization is driven by Sub-
Saharan Africa, where fractionalization is highest and declines last the longest on average.
6 Conclusion
This paper makes three contributions to a burgeoning literature on growth episodes and
structural breaks in growth performances. First, we show that a restricted structural
change approach, as in Papell and Prodan (2012), works well as an inferential method
for identifying slumps, big recessions or growth collapses in a large sample of countries.
We find a substantial number of slumps in developing and developed countries alike,
28Interestingly, there is only weak evidence in favor of unobserved heterogeneity. A Likelihood Ratio
test for the presence of shared frailties fails to reject the null (p = 0.252).
29In our sample, the average ELF15 score in Sub-Saharan Africa is 87 out of 100, compared to 62 in
the Middle East and North Africa and 34 in Latin America and the Caribbean.
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suggesting that severe downward volatility is an ubiquitous phenomenon in the post-
war period. Second, the slumps we identify have interesting characteristics, over and
above the expected macroeconomic symptoms. Some of these factors have received little
attention so far. Most prominently, we find systematic evidence of weak institutions
before slumps hit and positive institutional change during and in the immediate aftermath
of slumps. Our interpretation of this finding is that institutions may not only cause
growth, but volatility can also contribute to endogenous institutional change. Severe
economic crises bring about what we may call creative political destruction and raise
the pressure for institutional reform in a very broad sense. Third, we find robust
evidence that the duration until the exit of the decline phase depends on institutions
and particularly strongly on ethno-linguistic fractionalization. Further, we show that the
effect of institutions is non-linear and depends on the level of fractionalization.
As a whole, our results lend broad support to political economy theories emphasizing
the respective roles of institutions and social conflict. Effective coordination and responses
to slumps are hampered by a high degree of (latent) social tension as captured by
ethno-linguistic fractionalization. However, particularly strong institutions can put in
place coordination mechanisms that are able contain or resolve these conflicts within
the institutional framework. On the other hand, our findings also suggest that in less
ethnically fragmented societies institutions are less important as a determinant of the
length of declines. These results do not suggest that sound macroeconomic policies as
such do not matter, but they provide some indication that these policies may be secondary
to more fundamental factors. In addition, while the previous literature has stressed the
role of positive growth spurts, we show that slumps matter a lot and that the decline phase
can last very long in some cases. In fact, given that growth has been found comparatively
easy to ignite but difficult to sustain, a comparison of the relative effects of slumps versus
accelerations on long-run GDP levels would be an interesting extension of our findings.
Many avenues are still left unexplored. For example, we did not analyze the
determinants of the depth of slumps, which is a natural extension to a study of their
duration. More work can be done on nesting different models of restricted structural
change and statistically testing which pattern fits the data better. Last but not least,
much of the growth episodes literature still falls short of convincing causal analysis.
Future research should focus more on exploring the causal factors that are behind the
occurrence, duration and magnitude of different growth episodes – a challenging but
exciting area of research.
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A Appendix: Estimation of Structural Breaks
A.1 Sequential procedure for testing and dating breaks
The procedure described here is a modification of Bai’s (1997) sequential likelihood ratio
tests for structural change – see also the extensions in Bai and Perron (1998) and in Bai
(1999). We make an important simplifying assumption, namely, that all output series
are regime-wise trend-stationary. Verifying this assumption is beyond the scope of this
paper, as testing for unit roots in the presence of structural breaks (with sufficient power
and size) is still contested territory and our output series have only a moderate time
dimension (T < 60). Our implementation of the sequential procedure involves six steps:
1. Determine the optimal AR(p) trend model using the Bayesian information criterion
to adjust for serial correlation up to a maximum lag count (pmax). We set pmax = 4.
2. Specify the partial structural change model:
yt = α+βt+γ01(t > tb1)+γ1(t−tb1)1(t > tb1)+γ2(t−tb2)1(t > tb2)+
p∑
i=1
δiyt−i+t
where yt is the log of GDP per capita in year t, tbi are the possible break dates,
1(·) is an indicator function, and p is the lag order as determined by the optimal
AR(p) model. We require that tb2 ≥ tb1 + h for h = 4. In other words, the period
between two successive breaks making up the same episode is at minimum 4 years.
3. Define trimming parameter τ , where typically τ ∈ [0.05, 0.25]. The resulting
estimation sample (Λτ ) runs over [τT, (1 − τ)T ].30 The breaks are in the ranges
t̂b1 ∈ [τT, (1− τ)T − h] and t̂b2 ∈ [τT + h, (1− τ)T ]. We set τ = 0.05.
4. Compute the sup-W test statistic of the null of no break versus two breaks (H0 :
γ0 = γ1 = γ2 = 0) over t ∈ Λτ , under the restrictions that β > 0 and γ0 < 0:
sup
t∈Λτ
W (t̂b
1
1, . . . , t̂b
c
1; t̂b
1
2, . . . , t̂b
d
2; q) = sup
t∈Λτ
(
T − km
q
)
SSRrT − SSRuT
SSRuT
where q = 3, km is the number of parameters and SSR
r
T denotes the sum of squared
residuals under H0 and SSRuT are the sum of squared residuals under HA.
5. The critical value and empirical p-value of supt∈Λτ W (t̂b1, t̂b2; q) is bootstrapped, as
in finite samples comparable asymptotic tests often have poor size and power.31
6. If the sup-W statistic is significant at the desired level, the sample is split into two
new sub-samples from the beginning to the first break and from the second break
to the end, then the procedure restarts at (4) using the estimated AR-order from
before. If the bootstrapped supW ∗ test fails to reject in each sub-sample, or the
sub-samples are too small (T ≤ 20), then the procedure stops and all break pairs
have been found.
30For simplicity of exposition, we suppress an additional index running over the sub-samples (defined
in Step 6). T refers to the number of observations of the currently active sample.
31See, for example, Prodan (2008) who documents such poor finite sample properties for the Bai-
Perron multiple structural breaks procedure and recommends the bootstrap.
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A.2 Bootstrapping the sup-Wald statistic
There have been several suggestions on how to best bootstrap structural change tests
in particular or other popular time-series tests in general. For example, Hansen
(2000) suggests employing a fixed-design bootstrap allowing for non-stationarity, lagged
dependent variables and conditional heteroskedasticity. MacKinnon (2009), on the
contrary, shows that the recursive bootstrap of Diebold and Chen (1996) gives results
superior to most other bootstrap types (fixed-parameter, Sieve, pairs, block, double block)
and the asymptotic test in a simple application of an AR(1) model with an endogenous
break. Similarly, Papell and Prodan (2012) also favor a recursive bootstrap but do not
compare it to other methods. Hence, we use a recursive bootstrap similar to Diebold and
Chen (1996) as comparing these methods systematically is also well beyond the scope
of this paper.32 In line with usual notation, we denote all bootstrap quantities with the
superscript ‘∗’. The bootstrap procedure is as follows:
1. Specify the optimal break model under theH0 of no structural breaks in the specified
sample using the BIC as before and obtain the residuals:
eˆt = yt − αˆ− βˆt−
p∑
i=1
δˆiyt−i
2. Draw new residuals: eˆ∗t = ut, with ut ∼ i.i.d. N (0, σ2eˆ)
3. Construct a bootstrap sample of equal size as the original sample:
y∗t = αˆ + βˆt+
p∑
i=1
δˆiy
∗
t−i + eˆ
∗
t , ∀t = 1 + p, . . . , T
where y∗t−i is the observed yt−i only in the case of a fixed-design bootstrap, otherwise
y∗t must be constructed recursively (conditional on p observed initial values of {yt}).
4. Rerun the break search algorithm on the bootstrap series {y∗t }, including
determination of the optimal AR(p) model, and compute bootstrapped supW ∗ test
statistic supit∈Λτ W
∗(t̂b
∗
1, t̂b
∗
2; q), where i indexes the current bootstrap iteration.
5. Repeat from Step (2) until i = B, where B is the total number of bootstrap
replications. We set B = 1000.
6. The bootstrap p-value (pˆ∗) is obtained by counting the proportion the estimated
bootstrap test statistics are greater than the originally estimated test statistic:
pˆ∗ =
1
B
B∑
i=1
1
(
i
sup
t̂b
∗
1,t̂b
∗
2∈Λτ
W ∗(t̂b
∗
1, t̂b
∗
2; q) > sup
t̂b1,t̂b2∈Λτ
W (t̂b1, t̂b2; q)
)
and the critical value corresponds to the ith = (1 − αs)B element of the sorted
vector of bootstrap statistics Γ = [supmint∈Λτ W
∗(·), . . . , supmaxt∈Λτ W ∗(·)], where αs is
the desired significance level (10% throughout the text, if not otherwise noted).
32We use a parametric recursive bootstrap, but informally compared the results to other techniques.
Hansen’s fixed-design bootstrap generates (too) many questionable slumps and the Wild bootstrap rejects
(too) often. Residual and parametric bootstraps give similar results. A systematic comparison is planned.
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B Appendix: List of Episodes
Table 7 – Global Parameters
Data: PWT Max AR (pmax): 4
Sample start: 1950 Bootstrap replications: 1000
Sample end: 2008 Bootstrap errors: parametric
Trimming (τ): 0.05 Bootstrap type: recursive
Min. tbi distance (h): 4 Bootstrap significance (α
s): 0.1
Table 8 – Estimated and Filtered Breaks with Troughs: 58 Episodes*
Code T0 t̂b1 t̂min t̂b2 T Sup-W Critical W p-value Drop (%) Duration c
ALB 1970 1990 1991 2002 2008 18.5 13.6 0.007 -15.32 1 0
ARE 1986 1990 1999 2002 2008 29.1 14.5 0.003 -10.90 9 0
AUS 1950 1954 1957 1966 2008 8.3 8.7 0.064 -0.72 3 0
AUS 1967 1989 1991 1998 2008 10.1 10.7 0.059 -2.29 2 0
BDI 1960 1971 1972 1988 2008 9.9 11.3 0.089 -3.23 1 0
BEL 1950 1957 1958 1973 2008 12.8 12.1 0.029 -2.24 1 0
BGR 1970 1988 1997 1997 2008 16.3 12.8 0.010 -23.79 9 0
BHR 1970 1980 1987 1986 2008 14.4 11.0 0.010 -44.12 7 1
BRA 1950 1980 1983 2003 2008 12.5 12.3 0.043 -14.60 3 0
CAF 1960 1978 2005 2005 2008 8.3 8.7 0.060 -46.38 27 1
CHE 1950 1974 1975 1978 2008 10.7 10.6 0.047 -7.87 1 0
CHL 1951 1953 1954 1972 1973 12.0 8.5 0.017 -9.06 1 0
CHL 1951 1974 1975 1979 1980 13.3 10.8 0.021 -16.50 1 0
CHL 1951 1981 1983 1995 2008 12.6 11.4 0.025 -21.22 2 0
CHN 1952 1960 1962 1977 2008 13.9 12.9 0.029 -23.71 2 0
CMR 1960 1986 1995 1990 2008 12.0 12.3 0.055 -40.46 9 1
COG 1960 1974 1977 1982 2008 11.9 12.5 0.069 -21.35 3 0
CRI 1950 1955 1956 1963 1979 11.4 11.3 0.048 -4.39 1 0
CRI 1950 1980 1982 2002 2008 17.2 10.6 0.002 -17.47 2 0
CUB 1970 1988 1993 1995 2008 11.4 12.5 0.072 -34.70 5 0
CYP 1950 1973 1975 1977 2008 15.5 9.7 0.001 -31.40 2 0
CYP 1978 1990 1991 1995 2008 11.6 14.6 0.098 -10.19 1 0
DNK 1950 1954 1955 1965 2008 12.9 11.7 0.022 -1.56 1 0
DZA 1960 1984 1994 1996 2008 10.9 8.2 0.013 -14.09 10 0
ETH 1950 1972 1992 1993 2008 11.5 10.2 0.020 -30.68 20 0
FIN 1950 1989 1993 2006 2008 10.6 10.8 0.057 -16.34 4 0
GAB 1960 1976 1987 1997 2008 10.6 11.2 0.062 -50.56 11 1
GMB 1960 1982 1998 2002 2008 16.4 11.2 0.006 -25.33 16 0
GRC 1951 1973 1974 1994 2008 17.9 11.6 0.003 -6.92 1 0
GTM 1950 1980 1988 1984 2008 15.1 12.3 0.015 -19.14 8 0
HUN 1970 1990 1992 2004 2008 15.6 13.5 0.018 -10.56 2 0
IDN 1960 1997 1999 2001 2008 13.5 10.6 0.013 -17.49 2 0
IRN 1955 1976 1981 1980 2008 15.9 11.6 0.004 -56.78 5 1
IRQ 1970 1990 2003 1994 2008 9.1 8.9 0.046 -66.43 13 1
JPN 1950 1973 1974 1990 2008 13.5 13.4 0.050 -2.85 1 0
MEX 1950 1981 1988 1995 2008 11.9 11.0 0.038 -17.03 7 0
MNG 1970 1990 1993 2003 2008 46.5 11.7 0.000 -41.81 3 0
MOZ 1960 1981 1986 1995 2008 12.6 12.0 0.037 -24.99 5 0
MYS 1955 1984 1986 1993 2008 9.1 10.5 0.093 -7.47 2 0
NPL 1960 1979 1980 2000 2008 10.6 8.9 0.025 -5.33 1 0
NZL 1950 1974 1978 1992 2008 9.9 10.5 0.070 -9.03 4 0
Continued on next page
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Table 8 – Continued from previous page
Code T0 t̂b1 t̂min t̂b2 T Sup-W Critical W p-value Drop (%) Duration c
OMN 1970 1979 1980 1985 2008 12.4 9.0 0.007 -21.61 1 0
PER 1950 1958 1959 1966 1976 11.9 9.3 0.022 -6.91 1 0
PER 1950 1977 1992 1992 2008 11.0 10.3 0.037 -29.30 15 0
PHL 1950 1983 1985 2003 2008 12.8 10.2 0.007 -16.78 2 0
POL 1970 1979 1982 1993 2008 13.8 12.1 0.027 -22.55 3 0
PRY 1980 1989 2002 2002 2008 8.8 8.8 0.049 -14.24 13 1
RWA 1960 1993 1994 1997 2008 18.0 7.9 0.001 -45.38 1 0
SAU 1986 1992 1999 2002 2008 14.6 13.3 0.039 -18.75 7 0
SLE 1961 1995 1999 2006 2008 14.2 11.1 0.011 -41.65 4 1
SLV 1950 1978 1983 1987 2008 18.2 10.2 0.002 -25.82 5 0
TGO 1960 1979 2008 1989 2008 9.6 10.1 0.065 -53.60 29 1
THA 1950 1996 1998 2003 2008 10.7 7.8 0.003 -14.17 2 0
TTO 1950 1961 1963 1969 1981 16.8 14.9 0.020 -0.78 2 0
TTO 1950 1982 1993 2006 2008 12.4 12.6 0.054 -28.96 11 0
UGA 1950 1977 1986 1987 2008 11.6 10.5 0.029 -30.27 9 0
USA 1950 1957 1958 1966 2008 8.7 9.3 0.075 -2.51 1 0
ZMB 1955 1968 2001 2000 2008 15.0 10.9 0.007 -68.99 33 1
* Out of a total of 70 episodes identified by the sequential algorithm, 12 are invalid slumps. The invalid episodes are [country
code (spell number)]: AUT (1), AUT (2), CHN (1), FIN (1), HKG (1), IRN (1), MRT (1), PRY (1), TZA (1).
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C Appendix: Data Sources and Summary Statistics
Table 9 – Summary Statistics: break date to trough
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N × T Source
Institutions, Politics & Conflict
Polity Score -1.90 6.99 346 Polity IV
Democracy 2.73 3.61 330 Polity IV
Autocracy 4.69 3.74 330 Polity IV
Executive Recruitment 4.92 2.27 330 Polity IV
Executive Constraints 3.18 2.28 330 Polity IV
Political Competition 4.11 3.38 330 Polity IV
Regime Duration 18.14 22.70 347 Polity IV
Negative Regime Change 0.01 0.12 347 Polity IV
Positive Regime Change 0.10 0.29 347 Polity IV
Corruption (ICRG) 2.63 1.10 193 ICRG
Fractionalization (ELF1) 18.36 18.69 348 Desmet et al. (2012)
Fractionalization (ELF15) 63.68 30.71 348 Desmet et al. (2012)
Inequality (Gini) 45.83 11.65 192 Solt (2009)
Leader Exit 0.39 0.49 344 Goemans et al. (2009)
War/Conflict (major) 0.12 0.33 348 Gleditsch et al. (2002)
War/Conflict (any) 0.24 0.43 348 Gleditsch et al. (2002)
Macro I: Prices, Trade & Exports
Inflation (ln(1 + δ)) 22.89 43.97 292 WDI/IFS
RER Undervalue 0.07 0.54 348 PWT 7.0
Current Account Balance (% of GDP) -3.98 6.70 254 WDI
∆ Terms of Trade -4.11 17.72 224 WDI/IFS
Manufactures (% of Exports) 22.65 24.27 264 WITS/ COMTRADE
Trade Openness (de facto) 67.85 37.43 348 PWT 7.0
Trade Openness (de jure) 0.23 0.42 306 Wacziarg and Welch (2008)
Export Sophisticaton 8.43 0.42 234 Hausmann et al. (2007)
∆ Export Sophistication 1.48 7.44 233 Hausmann et al. (2007)
Export Diversification 65.91 24.58 264 WITS/ COMTRADE
Macro II: Finance
Capital Account Openness -0.49 1.28 304 Chinn and Ito (2006)
Financial Integration 115.30 88.18 309 Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007)
Financial Depth 32.35 18.68 245 Beck et al. (2010)
Financial Development 68.40 22.18 271 Beck et al. (2010)
Private Credit (% of GDP) 26.25 23.53 248 Beck et al. (2010)
FDI Liabilities (% of GDP) 15.11 15.66 309 Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007)
External Debt Liabilities (% of GDP) 65.22 59.18 309 Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007)
External Leveragea 165.29 327.09 307 Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007)
Other Determinants
Initial ln GDP per capitab 8.20 1.21 348 PWT 7.0
Real US Interest Ratec 1.90 2.44 348 FRED
Infant Mortalityd 73.37 40.23 348 World Population Prospects
Life Expectancyd 58.63 10.55 348 World Population Prospects
Telephones (per 100 people) 5.24 9.78 312 WDI
Education (primary) 3.14 1.71 327 Barro and Lee (2010)
Education (secondary) 1.12 0.83 327 Barro and Lee (2010)
Education (all) 4.44 2.47 327 Barro and Lee (2010)
a Following Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012), external leverage is li = (τ + Ai/Yi)(τ + NAi/Yi + Eij/Yi)
−1,
where τ is the market value of assets to output (set to 3) and j is the rest of the world, Ai/Yi is assets
over GDP, NAi/Yi is net foreign assets over GDP and Eij/Yi equity over GDP. The ratio is always > 0 if
NAi > −300, this condition is not satisfied in very few cases; we set these missing.
b Initial refers to ln GDP per capita at t0, that is, the last year before the slump.
c Deflated three months treasury bill rate.
d Converted into annual data by interpolation. If the average is for the years 1950-55, we assume it is reached
in the 1952 and linearly interpolate to the middle of the next group (1957), and so on. The data is from the
2010 edition of the Word Population Prospects (medium-fertility variant).
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D Appendix: Duration Method
Log-normal Accelerated Failure Time (AFT) models
Given the model ln(t˜) = β0 + x
′β + , log-normality implies the following relationships.
Setting all covariates zero, the expected survival time is E[ln t|β = 0] = β0. Hence, the
baseline survival and hazard functions are
S0(t˜) = 1− Φ
(
(ln t˜− β0)σ−1
)
and λ0(t˜) =
φ
(
(ln t˜− β0)σ−1
)(
1− Φ ((ln t˜− β0)σ−1))σt˜
where φ(·) and Φ(·) are the standard normal pdf and normal cdf, respectively.
Including (time-invariant) covariates is equivalent to scaling the baseline survival
functions. The conditional survival curve is defined as S(t˜|x) = S0(t˜)
(
exp(−x′β)t˜). This
implies S(t˜|x) = 1 − Φ ((ln t˜− (β0 + x′β))σ−1); that is, the intercept can be absorbed
into β. The density and cumulative probability functions are defined implicitly.33
Time-varying covariates introduce two complications. First, the hazard rate at each
unit of analysis time t˜ is not independent from previous realizations of the time-varying
covariates. Second, the covariates must be strictly exogenous, as otherwise feedback may
occur from the duration to future realizations of the covariates. Following Lancaster
(1990) and Kalbfleisch and Prentice (2002) these issues can be formalized as follows. For
time-varying covariates x(t˜), let xH(t˜) denote the covariate path up until time t˜, so that
xH(t˜) ≡ {x(u), 0 ≤ u ≤ t˜} for all t˜ ≥ 0, then the conditional hazard function is:
λ(t˜|xH) = lim
dt˜−>0
Pr(t˜ ≤ T˜ < t˜+ dt˜ | T˜ ≥ t˜,xH(t˜+ dt˜))
dt˜
Lancaster (1990, pp. 26–30) and Kalbfleisch and Prentice (2002, p. 196) define strict
exogeneity as Pr(xH(t˜) | xH(u), T˜ ≥ u) = Pr(xH(t˜) | xH(u), T˜ = u) for all 0 < u ≤ t˜.
The condition states that the future path of the time-varying covariate is not affected by
the event occurring at present.
We can now derive the partial likelihood.34 Suppose we know the event occurs at t˜i,
the likelihood contribution of an observation i at time j = t˜i then is Li = f(j) = S(j)λ(j).
The likelihood contribution of an observation that has not failed at time j, so that j < t˜i,
then is just the probability of survival until j: Li = f(j) = S(j). Hence, right-censoring
is essentially nothing else than an observation at analysis time j that is still in the sample
but has not yet failed and thus extends easily to (exogenous) time-varying covariates.
Using the notation for grouped data from Wooldridge (2010, p. 1016), the log-
likelihood of the log-normal model with time-varying covariates can be expressed as:
lnL(β, σ) =
N∑
i=1
t˜i−1∑
j=1
lnαj(x
′
ijβ, σ) + (1− ci) ln
(
1− αt˜i(x′it˜iβ, σ)
)
where αj(·) = exp[−
∫ αj
αj−1 λ(s, ·)ds] measures survival over the given interval and ci
indicates if observation i is censored. The inner sum (first term) is the probability of
survival until t˜i − 1 and the second term is the conditional probability of failure at t˜i.
33It follows that an expression for the (log) hazard function conditional on the covariates is lnλ(t˜|x) =
lnλ0
(
t˜ exp(−x′β))− x′β; these hazards are not proportional.
34This does not apply to frailty models where the likelihoods are more involved.
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E Appendix: Variable Selection
Table 10 – Base Models
Coefficient SE p-value Exits Spells Years logL
Constant Only 1.346 0.180 0.00 48 58 348 -87.86
Initial ln GDP per capita -0.124 0.144 0.39 48 58 348 -87.44
Real US Interest Rate 0.096 0.047 0.04 48 58 348 -86.55
Note(s): The second and third model also include a constant. The standard errors are clustered on the country level.
Table 11 – Variable Selection
Coefficient SE p-value Exits Spells Years logL
Inflation (ln(1 + δ)) -0.002 0.004 0.68 38 45 234 -64.62
RER Underval -0.144 0.333 0.67 48 58 348 -86.13
Trade Openness (de jure) -1.019 0.304 0.00 43 52 316 -74.89
Trade Openness (de facto) 0.014 0.005 0.00 48 58 348 -80.82
Current Account Balance -0.000 0.027 1.00 27 34 222 -47.79
Manufactures (% Exports) -0.015 0.007 0.04 24 31 236 -42.26
∆ Terms of Trade -0.007 0.017 0.68 24 27 164 -36.63
Export Diversification -0.015 0.008 0.07 24 31 236 -42.29
Export Sophistication -2.131 0.574 0.00 28 34 241 -45.86
Capital Account Openness -0.016 0.125 0.90 32 41 275 -59.63
Financial Integration 0.000 0.003 0.88 35 43 271 -61.67
Financial Depth -0.015 0.005 0.00 26 33 195 -44.81
Financial Development 0.006 0.009 0.55 31 39 266 -57.87
External Debt Liabilities 0.000 0.007 0.98 35 43 271 -61.69
External Leverage 0.003 0.014 0.82 35 43 271 -61.64
FDI Liabilities -0.004 0.018 0.83 35 43 271 -61.67
Private Credit -0.013 0.004 0.00 28 35 198 -47.09
Polity IV Score -0.064 0.018 0.00 47 57 346 -80.27
Democracy Score -0.118 0.032 0.00 47 57 346 -80.43
Autocracy Score 0.127 0.038 0.00 47 57 346 -80.57
Executive Recruitment -0.163 0.057 0.00 47 57 346 -81.90
Executive Constraints (INS0) -0.218 0.065 0.00 47 57 346 -79.70
Political Competition -0.122 0.038 0.00 47 57 346 -80.89
Regime Durability -0.002 0.005 0.72 47 57 346 -84.96
Corruption (ICRG) -0.486 0.141 0.00 14 18 98 -19.29
Fractionalization (ELF1) 0.018 0.007 0.01 48 58 348 -83.82
Fractionalization (ELF15) 0.018 0.004 0.00 48 58 348 -78.07
Inequality (Gini) 0.045 0.023 0.05 22 27 137 -34.73
Leader Exit 0.424 0.360 0.24 47 57 346 -84.18
War/Conflict (major) 0.179 0.875 0.84 48 58 348 -86.19
War/Conflict (any) 0.469 0.553 0.40 48 58 348 -85.73
Infant Mortality 0.014 0.006 0.02 48 58 348 -83.18
Life Expectancy -0.060 0.030 0.05 48 58 348 -83.03
Education (Primary) -0.356 0.096 0.00 46 56 327 -76.39
Education (Secondary) -0.448 0.165 0.01 46 56 327 -79.76
Education (All) -0.254 0.063 0.00 46 56 327 -76.17
Telephones per capita -0.021 0.014 0.13 30 38 257 -52.57
Note(s): All models also include initial GDP per capita, the real US interest rate, and a constant. The standard
errors are clustered on the country level.
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